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Footnotes
1. There are a number of ways in which a criminal case can reach the
Supreme Court of Canada by way of appeal. They involve obtain-
ing “leave to appeal” from the Supreme Court and appeals “as of
right”: (1) the Supreme Court can grant leave to appeal on a ques-
tion of law (see sections 691(1)(b) and 691(2)(c) of the Criminal
Code); (2) an accused person has a right to appeal to the Supreme
Court if a conviction is affirmed or an acquittal set aside on any
question of law upon which a judge of the Court of Appeal dis-
sents (see sections 691(1)(b) and 691(2)(a) of the Criminal
Code); (3) an accused person has a right to appeal to the Supreme
Court on a question of law if their acquittal at trial is set aside and
the Court of Appeal enters a verdict of guilty (see section
691(2)(b) of the Criminal Code); (4) the Crown can appeal as of
right when a conviction is set aside by a Court of Appeal if a judge
of the Court of Appeal dissents on a question of law (see section
693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code); (5) the Crown can appeal if
granted leave by the Supreme Court on a question of law when a
conviction is set aside by the Court of Appeal (see section
693(1)(b) of the Criminal Code); and (6) through the Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C. 1985.
2. R. v. Brassington, 2018 SCC 37 (Can.).
3. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 37(1). 
In this edition’s article, I will review decisions rendered by theSupreme Court of Canada concerning criminal law mattersduring the period of January 1 to October 31, 2018. As will be
seen, the Supreme Court considered a multitude of criminal law
issues, including the obligation of the Crown to disclose evi-
dence to the accused, the offences of influence peddling and
first-degree murder, and the impact of mistake of law in impos-
ing sentence and informer privilege. Let us start with the Court’s
consideration of the law of evidence and informer privilege.1
EVIDENCE
INFORMER PRIVILEGE AND SOLICITOR CLIENT COM-
MUNICATIONS:
In R. v. Brassington, four police officers with the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police were charged with offences, including an
attempt to obstruct the course of justice, relating to alleged
misconduct during a police investigation.2 The Supreme Court
noted that when the officers “were charged, the RCMP and the
Crown told them that they were prohibited from discussing
‘the circumstances of their investigations in a manner that
might reveal the identity of confidential informers to anyone,
including their legal counsel.’”
Before their trial, they applied for a declaration that they
could discuss with their defence counsel information they
learned during the investigation that might reveal the identity
of confidential informers. The application judge granted the
application, declaring that the officers could discuss any infor-
mation in their possession with counsel. She held that the
“requirement of proving ‘innocence at stake’ did not apply”
because the exception fit poorly in circumstances where “the
accused already knows the privileged information and merely
seeks to discuss it with counsel.”
The Crown and the RCMP applied pursuant to section 37 of
the Canada Evidence Act, for an order that disclosure be pro-
hibited:
[A] Minister of the Crown in right of Canada or other
official may object to the disclosure of information before
a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the
production of information by certifying orally or in writ-
ing to the court, person or body that the information
should not be disclosed on the grounds of a specified
public interest.3
The application judge dismissed the application. The Crown
appealed. The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal, holding that the order allowing disclosure was civil
rather than criminal in nature and thus an appeal under section
37(1) was unavailable.
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court described the issue raised as being: “[W]hen
police officers are charged with crimes relating to their conduct
during an investigation, can they, at their own discretion, dis-
close to their defence lawyers information they learned during
that investigation that might reveal the identity of a confiden-
tial informer?”
The Supreme Court allowed the Crown’s appeal. It held that
the declaratory order should be set aside. It granted an order pur-
suant to section 37(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibiting
the officers from disclosing informer privileged information to
their counsel, subject to a successful innocence-at-stake applica-
tion. The Court indicated that “the ‘privilege should be infringed
only where core issues going to the guilt of the accused are
involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful conviction. 
. . .’ There are no other exceptions to informer privilege.” 
The Supreme Court concluded that the officers were not
entitled to disclose the informer-privileged information to their
lawyers: "Our jurisprudence prevents piercing informer privi-
lege unless the accused can show that his or her innocence is
at stake. . . . No evidence of 'innocence at stake' was presented.
The police officers are therefore not entitled to disclose the
information to their lawyers." 
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4. R. v. Cain, [2018] 421 D.L.R. 239 (Can.).
5. R. v. Gagnon, 2018 SCC 41 (Can.). 
6. R. v. Gubbins and Vallentgoed, 2018 SCC 44 (Can.).  
Finally, the Court held that 
requiring the police officers to exercise caution with
respect to what information they disclose to their
lawyers does not amount to a per se interference with
their constitutional rights. Police officers bear particular
responsibilities by virtue of the positions of power and
trust they occupy, including obligations to keep
informer-privileged information in the strictest confi-
dence. Neither the right to solicitor-client privilege nor
the right to make full answer and defence relieves police
officers of those obligations. 
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS:
In R. v. Cain, the accused was convicted of the offence of
sexual assault. A majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
(Justice Scanlon dissenting) dismissed his appeal.4
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada as of
right. The Supreme Court considered the appeal based upon
the issue of whether the trial judge used a prior consistent
statement of the complainant to confirm the truth of her testi-
mony at the trial.
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court stated:
The trial judge found that the inconsistencies
involved only insignificant peripheral matters, and so he
rejected Mr. Cain’s contention that any inconsistencies
rendered the complainant not credible or her evidence
unreliable. The trial judge did not rely on consistencies
between the statements and testimony to bolster the
truth of the complainant’s testimony. This was an appro-
priate use of a prior consistent statement and did not
constitute an error of law.
OFFENCES
SEXUAL-ASSAULT CONSENT: 
In R. v. Gagnon, Warrant Officer J. Gagnon was charged with
the offence of sexual assault, an offence punishable under sec-
tion 130 of the National Defence Act.5 He was acquitted by a
court-martial panel. The Crown appealed to the Court Martial
Appeal Court of Canada, arguing that the Military Trial Judge
erred in placing the defence of honest belief in consent before
the panel. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court stated: “[T]here was no evidence from which a
trier of fact could find that the appellant had taken reasonable
steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting. . . . It
follows that the defence of honest but mistaken belief should
not have been put to the panel.”
PROCEDURE
CROWN DISCLOSURE:
In R. v. Gubbins and Vallentgoed, two accused were each
charged with the offence of operating a motor vehicle with a
blood-alcohol level exceeding .08, contrary to section
253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. In each case, the essential evi-
dence against them was the results of the analysis of their
breath conducted on breathalyzer machines.6
Before their trials, both of the accused requested that the
Crown disclose to them the maintenance records for the
breathalyzer machines used to analyze their breath samples.
The Crown refused to provide the requested disclosure. 
Mr. Vallentgoed’s application was dismissed and he was sub-
sequently convicted at trial. Mr. Gubbins was granted a stay of
proceedings on the basis of the Crown’s failure to disclose the
records. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal considered both matters on
appeal. A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Val-
lentgoed’s conviction. It set aside the stay entered in relation to
Mr. Gubbins and remitted his matter for a new trial.
THE APPEAL:
Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court of Canada by
both accused. The Supreme Court described the issues raised
by the appeals in the following manner:
These appeals deal with the scope of the Crown’s dis-
closure obligations with respect to maintenance records
of breathalyzer instruments. . . . Are the maintenance
records part of first party disclosure, subject to inclusion
in the Crown’s standard disclosure package? Or, are
these records third party records, which require the
defence to demonstrate their likely relevance before an
order for disclosure can be made?
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA:
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed both appeals. It
held that these “records are subject to third party (rather than
first party) disclosure. On the evidence in both cases, the
defence failed to show that the maintenance records meet the
requisite threshold for third party disclosure.” 
The Supreme Court noted that it has held that held that “the
Crown has a duty to disclose all relevant, non-privileged infor-
mation in its possession or control, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory. This is referred to as first party disclosure.” How-
ever, the “Crown” for the purposes of disclosure “does not refer
to all Crown entities, but only to the prosecuting Crown . . . . All
other Crown entities, including police, are third parties for the
purposes of disclosure.” For third-party disclosure to occur, an
accused person must “show that the record is ‘likely relevant.’”
The Supreme Court held that to determine if a record is sub-
ject to first- or third-party disclosure, the following factors
should be considered: 
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(1) Is the information that is sought in the possession
or control of the prosecuting Crown? and (2) Is the
nature of the information sought such that the police or
another Crown entity in possession or control of the
information ought to have supplied it to the prosecuting
Crown?
The Supreme Court concluded that the maintenance
records are not part of first-party disclosure because they “are
not in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown.
They do not form part of the ‘fruits of the investigation’; and
the evidence in this case is that the maintenance records are
not ‘obviously relevant’ to the cases of the accused . . . .”
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE:
The Supreme Court held that neither accused had proven
that the maintenance records were “likely relevant” as to
whether “an instrument was malfunctioning or operated
improperly [and i]n the absence of any such evidence, the
expert evidence of the Crown is persuasive that the mainte-
nance records are not relevant. By its nature, this is a technical
and scientific question, not a matter of doctrine.” 
CERTIORARI:
In R. v. Awashish, a companion case to Gubbins, the accused
was also charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-
alcohol level exceeding .08, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of
the Criminal Code.7 Before her trial, she applied for an order
requiring the Crown to “inquire” into the existence of mainte-
nance records for the breathalyzer machine used to analyze her
breath. The application was granted by a provincial-court
judge.
The Crown successfully obtained an order of certiorari to
quash the order. The accused appealed to the Quebec Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that
certiorari was not available because the trial judge’s decision
was made within the exercise of her jurisdiction as the trial
judge. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court indicated
that resort to certiorari is “tightly limited by the Criminal Code
and the common law so as to ensure that it is not used to do
an ‘end-run’ around the rule against interlocutory appeals.”
The Court held that 
certiorari in criminal proceedings is available to parties
only for a jurisdictional error by a provincial court judge.
. . . For third parties, certiorari is available to review
jurisdictional errors as well as errors on the face of the
record relating to a decision of a final and conclusive
character vis-à-vis the third party . . . .
The Supreme Court held that the order of certiorari should
not have been issued because the decision of the trial judge did
not involve a jurisdictional error. However, the Supreme Court
concluded that “Ms. Awashish did not establish a basis for the
records’ existence or relevance. The Crown was therefore
under no obligation to inquire into the matter.” The trial judge
“erred in holding otherwise. However, given that she made no
jurisdictional error, certiorari cannot be used to correct that
error.”
INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS OF PUBLICATION
BANS:
In R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the accused was
charged with the first-degree murder of a person under the age
of eighteen.8 At the trial, a publication ban was issued pro-
hibiting the publication, broadcast, or transmission in any way
of any information that could identify the victim, pursuant to
section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code.
Before the issuance of the publication ban, the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) had posted information on
its website, which revealed the identity of the victim. After the
publication ban was issued, the CBC refused to remove the
information.
The Crown sought the issuing of a mandatory interlocutory
injunction directing the removal of the victim’s identifying
information from the website. 
The application judge dismissed the application, conclud-
ing that the Crown had not established the requirements for an
interlocutory injunction. The Crown appealed. A majority of
the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the
injunction. 
The CBC appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
appeal was allowed and the injunction was set aside. The
Supreme Court indicated that an application for a mandatory
interlocutory injunction must satisfy three elements: 
At the first stage, the application judge is to under-
take a preliminary investigation of the merits to decide
whether the applicant demonstrates a “serious question
to be tried” . . . . The applicant must then, at the second
stage, convince the court that it will suffer irreparable
harm if an injunction is refused. Finally, the third stage
of the test requires an assessment of the balance of con-
venience, in order to identify the party which would suf-
fer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the inter-
locutory injunction. . . .
The Supreme Court also indicated that this constituted a
“general framework” and that there are cases “which require ‘an
extensive review of the merits’ at the first stage of the analysis.”
The Supreme Court held that an application for a manda-
tory interlocutory injunction, the appropriate criterion for
assessing the strength of the applicant’s case at the first stage
“is not whether there is a serious issue to be tried, but rather
whether the applicant has shown a strong prima facie case”:
A mandatory injunction directs the defendant to
undertake a positive course of action, such as taking
steps to restore the status quo, or to otherwise “put the
situation back to what it should be”. . . . 
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9. R. v. Noremore, 2018 SCC 42 (Can.). 
10. R. v. Black, 2018 SCC 10, [2018] 419 D.L.R. 1 (Can.). 
11. In her dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal, Pardu J.A. stated:
Unlike my colleagues, I am not prepared to infer that the
trial judge engaged in the necessary reasoning from the con-
clusory statements . . . . [T]he majority concludes, based on
the context of the evidence and the arguments made at trial,
that the trial judge implicitly held that the appellant in this
case knowingly imported cocaine. . . .
I am not convinced that in this case the trial judge’s reason-
ing was apparent enough in the context of the record for it to
be discernable to this court without this court having to
reassess the case itself and substitute its own analysis. There
may be an implicit route available from the trial judge’s explicit
factual findings . . . to a finding of the appellant’s guilt, but “it
is not appropriate for this court to attempt to discern that route
and explain it”: R. v. Capano, 2014 ONCA 599, 313 C.C.C. (3d)
135, at para. 74. 
R. v. Black, 2017 ONCA 599 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
12. R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6, [2018] 422 D.L.R. 469 (Can.).
13. In R. v. Baksza, 2018 ABCA 873, [2018] A.J. No. 873 (Can. Alta.
C.A.), the Alberta Court of Appeal considered A.R.J.D., and indi-
cated that it illustrated “the dangers associated with judging while
wearing stereotypical blinders.” 
14. R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25 (Can.). 
The Supreme Court concluded that “the chambers judge
applied the correct legal test in deciding the Crown’s applica-
tion, and his decision that the Crown’s case failed to satisfy that
test did not, in these circumstances, warrant appellate inter-
vention.” 
WHEN A WITNESS REFUSES TO ANSWER:
In R. v. Noremore, the accused was charged with the offence
of attempted murder.9 At his trial, a witness refused to answer
a question asked by defence counsel. The trial judge reminded
the witness of the potential consequences of failing to answer,
but the witness continued to refuse to answer, and the trial
judge did not cite the witness for contempt.
The accused was convicted and appealed. A majority of the
Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador overturned
the conviction, concluding that the trial judge’s failure to cite
the witness for contempt caused the trial to be unfair.
The Crown appealed, as of right, to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.
In an oral judgment the Supreme Court held that “the trial
judge did not err in the way in which he addressed a witness’s
refusal to answer a question put to him by defence counsel”:
The question the witness refused to answer was put to
him by defence counsel in an attempt to raise doubts
about who wrote two notes found in Mr. Normore’s res-
idence. The trial judge relied on these notes, along with
other evidence, to find that Mr. Normore had committed
the offences in question. However, in all of the circum-
stances of this case, including that Mr. Normore subse-
quently admitted to writing the most incriminating
statement in these notes, we are of the view that the trial
judge’s failure to take further steps to compel the witness
to answer the question put to him could not have had an
effect on the verdict. 
TRIAL JUDGE’S REASONS—SUFFICIENCY:
In R. v. Black, the accused was convicted of the offence of
importing cocaine into Canada.10 He appealed from convic-
tion, arguing that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient. A
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Pardu J.A., dissent-
ing) dismissed the appeal. The accused appealed, as of right, to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In a brief judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed
the appeal, stating:
We agree with Justice Pardu that the trial judge’s rea-
sons, even when read as a whole and in the context of
the trial record, fail to reveal the basis on which the trial
judge concluded that the Crown had proven the mental
element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
reasons fail to fulfil the function of permitting effective
appellate review.
The appeal is therefore allowed, and a new trial is
ordered.11
TRIAL JUDGE’S REASONS-STEREOTYPICAL THINKING:
In R. v. A.R.J.D., the accused was charged with three counts
of sexual assault.12 He was acquitted. The Crown’s appeal to
the Alberta Court of Appeal was successful, and a new trial was
ordered. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court considered the appeal on the issue of whether
the trial judge’s reasons illustrated the use of stereotypical
thinking in rejecting the complainant’s evidence.
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court of Canada issued the following judgment: 
In considering the lack of evidence of the com-
plainant’s avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge
committed the very error he had earlier in his reasons
instructed himself against: he judged the complainant’s
credibility based solely on the correspondence between
her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereo-
typical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error
of law.13
THE WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA:
In R. v. Wong, the accused pleaded guilty to the offence of
trafficking in cocaine and was sentenced to nine months of
imprisonment.14 Because of the accused’s status as a “perma-
nent resident of Canada,” the sentence had the consequence of
a loss of his permanent-resident status and a removal order
from Canada being issued without any right of appeal being
allowed. 
The accused appealed from conviction, seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea. He filed an affidavit indicating that before
entering his plea of guilty, he had been unaware of the possible
immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
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cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or
omission in connection with
(i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv),
or 
(ii) the appointment of any person, including them-
selves, to an office . . . .
In R. v. Carson, the accused was charged with the offence
“influence peddling,” contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the
Criminal Code.15
The accused had used government contacts to help a com-
pany, H2O Professionals Inc. (H20), sell water treatment sys-
tems to First Nation’s Communities. In exchange, H2O
promised to pay a commission to the accused’s girlfriend. After
the agreement was made, the accused spoke to government
officials at Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to promote the
purchase of H2O’s products. 
The trial judge entered an acquittal, having concluded that
it was the communities rather than the government that
decided whether to purchase the water systems. The Ontario
Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal and substituted a
conviction. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he sole issue in this appeal is
whether the assistance he promised to provide was in connec-
tion with ‘any matter of business relating to the government.’”
The Court found that the accused “admitted to having influ-
ence with the government. He also admitted that he demanded
a benefit for another person as consideration for assisting H2O
by calling upon his government contacts to promote the sale of
its water treatment systems to First Nations.”
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed. The
Supreme Court of Canada held that an offence under section
121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code “requires that the promised
influence be in fact connected to a matter of business that
relates to government” and “a matter of business relates to the
government if it depends on or could be facilitated by the gov-
ernment, given its mandate.”  
The Supreme Court described the elements of an offence
under section 121(1)(d) as being the following:
1. having or pretending to have influence with the gov-
ernment, a minister, or an official;
2. directly or indirectly demanding, accepting, or offer-
ing or agreeing to accept a reward, advantage or ben-
efit of any kind for oneself or another person;
3. as consideration for the cooperation, assistance, exer-
cise of influence, or an act or omission;
4. in connection with a transaction of business with or
any matter of business relating to the government.
The accused was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. 
The Supreme Court described the issue raised by the appeal
in the following manner:
This case concerns the proper approach for consider-
ing whether a guilty plea can be withdrawn on the basis
that the accused was unaware of a collateral conse-
quence stemming from that plea, such that holding him
or her to the plea amounts to a miscarriage of justice
under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code . . . .
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court indicated
that an accused person “need not show a viable defence to the
charge to withdraw a plea on procedural grounds.” The Court
held that in order to withdrawal a guilty plea the accused must
demonstrate “prejudice”:
In our view, an accused seeking to withdraw a guilty
plea must demonstrate prejudice by filing an affidavit
establishing a reasonable possibility that he or she would
have either (1) pleaded differently, or (2) pleaded guilty,
but with different conditions. . . .
A guilty plea on different conditions will suffice to
establish prejudice where a court finds that the accused
would have insisted on those conditions to enter a guilty
plea and where those conditions would have alleviated,
in whole or in part, the adverse effects of the legally rel-
evant consequence. . . . 
The Supreme Court also held that to be granted leave to
withdraw a guilty plea an accused person must “articulate a
meaningfully different course of action to justify vacating a
plea, and satisfy a court that there is a reasonable possibility he
or she would have taken that course.”
CONCLUSION—WONG:
The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal should be
dismissed because though the accused 
filed an affidavit before the Court of Appeal, he did not
depose to what he would have done differently in the
plea process had he been informed of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea . . . .
OFFENCES
INFLUENCE PEDDLING:
Section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code creates the offence
of “influence peddling,” which is defined as:
having or pretending to have influence with the govern-
ment or with a minister of the government or an official,
directly or indirectly demands, accepts or offers or agrees
to accept, for themselves or another person, a reward,
advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for
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The Supreme Court also held, at paragraph 24, that the
phrase “any matter of business relating to the government”
must be “interpreted broadly. A matter of business relates to
the government if it depends on government action or could be
facilitated by government, given its mandate. Thus, s.
121(1)(d) captures promises to exercise influence to change or
expand government programs.” 
The Court indicated that section 121(1)(d) 
criminalizes the selling of influence in connection with
any matter of business relating to the government. The
accused does not need to actually have influence with
the government, endeavour to exercise influence, or suc-
ceed in influencing government to be found guilty of this
offence. Indeed, the text of s. 121(1)(d) explicitly targets
everyone “having or pretending to have influence with
the government.” The offence is complete once the
accused demands a benefit in exchange for a promise to
exercise influence in connection with a matter of busi-
ness that relates to government.
The Supreme Court concluded that the accused’s 
promised assistance was in connection with a matter of
business relating to the government. . . . By demanding
a benefit in exchange for his promise to exercise his
influence with the government to H2O’s advantage, Mr.
Carson undermined the appearance of government
integrity. This is exactly the type of conduct s. 121(1)
(d)(i) is intended to prohibit. 
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER DURING A FORCIBLE CON-
FINEMENT:
Section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code indicates that if the
death of a person is caused during the commission of the
offence of forcible confinement, the murder is first-degree
murder:
Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and
deliberate on the part of any person, murder is first
degree murder in respect of a person when the death is
caused by that person while committing or attempting to
commit [either kidnapping or forcible confinement].
In R. v. Magoon, the accused were charged with the offence
of first-degree murder and convicted of the offence of second-
degree murder.16 The offence involved the killing of a young
child (Meika) by the child’s father and step-mother. The trial
judge had acquitted the accused of first-degree murder on the
basis that they had not forcibly confined Meika while inflicting
the blows that killed her.
The accused appealed from the second-degree murder con-
viction, and the Crown appealed from the acquittal on the
charge of first-degree murder.
The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal
and entered a conviction for first-degree murder. The accused
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The appeal was dis-
missed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal
did not err in finding the accused guilty of first-degree murder.
It held that the five elements of the offence as set out in the
section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, including a forcible
confinement, had been established at the trial.
The Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 61, that pur-
suant to section 231(5) of the Criminal Code, “second degree
murder becomes first degree murder where the accused com-
mits the murder in conjunction with one of the other offences
listed in that section, such as sexual assault or kidnapping. All
of the offences listed in s. 231(5) involve unlawful domina-
tion.”  
The Supreme Court referred to its decision in R. v. Harbot-
tle, and indicated that “for an accused to be convicted of first
degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code the Crown
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that”: 
(1) the accused was guilty of the underlying crime of
domination or of attempting to commit that crime; (2)
the accused was guilty of the murder of the victim; (3)
the accused participated in the murder in such a manner
that he was a substantial cause of the death of the victim;
(4) there was no intervening act of another which
resulted in the accused no longer being substantially
connected to the death of the victim; and (5) the crimes
of domination and murder were part of the same trans-
action.
The Supreme Court indicated that at “issue in this case are
the first and fifth Harbottle elements: Was Meika unlawfully
confined, and were the unlawful confinement and murder part
of the same transaction? We begin with the first element—
unlawful confinement.
FORCIBLE CONFINEMENT:
Section 279(2) of the Criminal Code states:
(2) Every one who, without lawful authority, confines,
imprisons or forcibly seizes another person is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary convic-
tion and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, at paragraph 64, that
pursuant to section 279(2) of the Criminal Code, the Crown
must show that: 
(1) the accused confined the victim, and (2) the confine-
ment was unlawful. . . . [U]nlawful confinement occurs if
17. R. v. Stephan, 2018 SCC 21, [2018] 423 D.L.R. 52 (Can.). 
18. In his dissenting reasons in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Justice
O’Ferrall held that the trial judge had failed to properly instruct
the jury “with respect to: (1) what a failure would have consisted
of for the purpose of the second element of the actus reus, and (2)
the evidence it should have considered in assessing whether there
had been a failure” and “erred in law in articulating the second
element of the actus reus of the offence of failing to provide the
necessaries of life.” [2017] ABCA 380 (Can. Alta. C.A.). 
19. R. v. Seipp, 2018 SCC 1, [2018] 362 C.C.C. 2 (Can.). 
20. R. v. G.T.D., 2018 SCC 7, [2018] 359 C.C.C. 340 (Can.).
“for any significant period of time [the victim] was coer-
cively restrained or directed contrary to her wishes, so
that she could not move about according to her own
inclination and desire” . . . . The “restriction need not be
to a particular place or involve total physical restraint.” 
. . . Restraint of the victim through physical acts of vio-
lence is sufficient but not necessary to establish unlawful
confinement. Confinement can be effected “by fear,
intimidation and psychological and other means.”
Regarding children, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated
that “a finding of confinement does not require evidence of a
child being physically bound or locked up; it can just as easily
result from evidence of controlling conduct.” 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that there was “no
doubt that Meika was confined on Sunday. She was coercively
restrained and directed contrary to her wishes. And the con-
finement was clearly unlawful. The acts of ‘discipline’ were
grossly disproportionate, cruel, degrading, deliberately harm-
ful, and far exceeded any acceptable form of parenting.” 
PART OF THE SAME TRANSACTION?
The Supreme Court concluded that “the unlawful confine-
ment and murder were part of the same transaction”: 
The course of unlawful confinement leading up to
Meika’s death was . . . the “continuing illegal domina-
tion” of Meika, representing an “exploitation of the posi-
tion of power created by the underlying crime.” . . . And
the unlawful confinement persisted right up to the
moment Meika lost consciousness.
CONCLUSION—MAGOON:
The Supreme Court concluded “that Ms. Magoon and Mr.
Jordan unlawfully confined Meika, and the unlawful confine-
ment and murder were two distinct criminal acts that formed
part of a single transaction. The Court of Appeal of Alberta did
not err in substituting verdicts of guilty for first degree murder.”
FAILING TO PROVIDE THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE:
Section 215 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a
parent to fail to provide “the necessaries of life” to a “person
under [their] charge.” 
In R. v. Stephan, the accused were convicted of the offence
of failing to provide the necessities of life to their child.17 Their
one-year-old son died when the accused parents did not take
him to a doctor but chose to treat him with homeopathic reme-
dies. The parents were charged and convicted with failing to
provide the necessities of life. 
An appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal by the accused
was dismissed (Justice O’Ferrall dissenting). The accused
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a brief oral judg-
ment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, stating: “[T]he
learned trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea of the
offence and did not sufficiently explain the concept of marked
departure in a way that the jury could understand and apply it.
Accordingly, we . . . quash the conviction and order a new
trial.”18
FAILING TO REMAIN AT THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT:
In R. v. Seipp, the accused was convicted of the offence of
failing to stop at the scene of an accident, contrary to section
252(1) of the Criminal Code.19 His appeal to the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That appeal
was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada considered the
appeal on the issue of whether the necessary intent had been
proven at the trial. In a brief oral judgment, the Court stated:
The evidence on which Mr. Seipp relies is that he fled
the scene to avoid criminal liability for possession of a
stolen vehicle. This is not evidence to the contrary.
Rather, it is evidence that Mr. Seipp intended to avoid
criminal or civil liability from his care, charge, or control
of the vehicle involved in the accident. Such an intent
falls within the ambit of the mens rea established by the
expression “intent to escape civil or criminal liability” in
s. 252(1). 
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
SECTIONS 10(B) AND 24(2):
Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees every arrested or
detained person in Canada the right to contact counsel “with-
out delay.” Section 24(2) of the Charter allows a trial judge to
exclude evidence if the evidence was obtained in violation of
the Charter.
In R. v. G.T.D., the accused was convicted of the offence of
sexual assault.20 His appeal to the Court of Appeal of Alberta
was dismissed. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada
on the issue of whether evidence led at the trial should have
been excluded based upon his right to contact counsel having
been infringed.
The appeal was allowed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the accused’s right to
contact counsel was infringed and that the evidence obtained
should be excluded: 
The right to counsel under s. 10 (b) of the Charter
obliges police to “‘hold off’ from attempting to elicit
incriminatory evidence from the detainee until he or she
has had a reasonable opportunity to reach counsel” (R. v.
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21. In R. v. Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3, [2018] Nu. J. No. 18, it was sug-
gested that G.T.D. stands for the proposition that proof of “a sys-
temic and institutional pattern of Charter violations by a police
service” will make the breach more likely to result in exclusion of
evidence:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v GTD,
2018 SCC 7, allowing the accused’s appeal on the basis of the
dissenting reasons of Veldhuis JA of this Court in R. v GTD,
2017 ABCA 274 [GTD], reiterates the seriousness of breaches
where the evidence lead at trial establishes a systemic and insti-
tutional pattern of Charter violations by a police service. That
matter concerned s 10(b) breaches by police whose standard
caution card asked all arrestees whether they wished to say
anything about the offence being charged after the arrestee was
advised and asserted his or her right to counsel, triggering the
state’s obligation to hold-off eliciting evidence.
22. R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 363 C.C.C. 1 (Can.). 
Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at p. 269). The first issue
in this appeal is whether the question “Do you wish to
say anything?,” asked at the conclusion of the standard
caution . . . after G.T.D. had already invoked his right to
counsel, violated this duty to “hold off.” We are all of the
view that it did, because it elicited a statement from
G.T.D. 21
SENTENCING
Refusing to Comply with a Breathalyzer Demand After
Causing an Accident Resulting in Death and the Effect of “Col-
lateral Consequences” and Mistake of Law on Sentencing:
In R. v. Suter, the accused drove his vehicle onto a restaurant
patio, killing a young child. The circumstances were described
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the following manner:
While the vehicle was stopped in that space, Mrs.
Suter turned to her husband and exclaimed “Maybe we
should just get a divorce.” At about the same moment,
she realized that the vehicle was inching forward, and she
yelled at her husband to stop. Unfortunately, Mr. Suter’s
foot had come off the brake pedal and instead of hitting
the brake, he pressed down on the gas pedal. The vehicle
accelerated through the glass partition and within a sec-
ond or two, it slammed into the restaurant wall.22
After the collision, the accused was pulled from his vehicle
and beaten by people at the scene. Subsequently, he was
abducted by a group of vigilantes who used a set of pruning
shears to cut off his thumb.
When the accused was arrested, the police made a demand
for samples of his breath to be provided for alcohol content
analysis. He spoke to counsel and refused to comply with the
demand. He subsequently was charged with and pleaded guilty
to the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample knowing
that he caused an accident resulting in a death, contrary to sec-
tion 255(3.2) of the Criminal Code. An expert report filed at
the sentence hearing indicated that the accused “would not
have blown ‘over 80’ [the lawful limit in Canada] had he pro-
vided the police with a breath sample.” The sentencing judge
described the offence as an “accident caused by a non-impaired
driving error.”
The sentencing judge imposed a period of four months of
imprisonment and a thirty-month driving prohibition. The
Crown appealed. 
The Court of Appeal of Alberta allowed the Crown’s appeal
and increased the period of imprisonment imposed to a period
of twenty-six months. The accused was granted leave to appeal
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court concluded that
the four-month period of imprisonment imposed by the sen-
tencing judge was “manifestly inadequate.” However, it also
held that the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal was
excessive. The Supreme Court reduced that sentence imposed
to time served (approximately ten-and-one-half months), but
upheld the driving prohibition.
The Supreme Court held that the Alberta Court of Appeal 
improperly recast the accident as one caused by health
and alcohol problems, anger, and distraction. It
reweighed the evidence and looked to external factors
that had no bearing on the gravity of the offence for
which Mr. Suter was charged, nor on Mr. Suter’s level of
moral blameworthiness. In doing so, the court effectively
punished Mr. Suter for a careless driving or dangerous
driving causing death offence for which he was neither
tried nor convicted. This was an error in principle that 
. . . resulted in the imposition of an unfit sentence. 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES:
The Supreme Court indicated that there “is no rigid formula
for taking collateral consequences into account. They may flow
from the length of sentence, or from the conviction itself.” The
Supreme Court described a collateral consequence as “any con-
sequence arising from the commission of an offence, the con-
viction for an offence, or the sentence imposed for an offence,
that impacts the offender.” The Supreme Court concluded that
the sentencing judge “correctly” considered “the vigilante vio-
lence experienced by Mr. Suter could be considered—to a lim-
ited extent—when crafting an appropriate sentence.” 
The Supreme Court held that collateral consequences “can-
not be used to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence
becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the
moral blameworthiness of the offender.” 
MISTAKE OF LAW:
The Supreme Court indicated that though a mistake of law 
is not a defence to a criminal charge . . . mistake of law can
nevertheless be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing .
. . . This is because offenders who honestly but mistakenly
believe in the lawfulness of their actions are less morally
blameworthy than offenders who—in committing the
same offence—are unsure about the lawfulness of their
actions, or know that their actions are unlawful.
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REFUSAL CHARGES AND LACK OF IMPAIRMENT:
The Supreme Court held that although “a finding of non-
impairment is a relevant mitigating factor when sentencing an
offender for a refusal offence, its mitigating effect must be lim-
ited.” The Court indicated that “the seriousness of the offence
and the moral blameworthiness of the offender stem primarily
from the refusal itself, and not from the offender’s level of
impairment.” 
AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE:
The Supreme Court indicated that “the sentencing range for
the s. 255(3.2) offence is the same as for impaired driving
causing death and driving ‘over 80’ causing death—low peni-
tentiary sentences of 2 or 3 years to more substantial peniten-
tiary sentences of 8 to 10 years, depending on the circum-
stances.” 
After referring to the “attenuating circumstances” present,
the Supreme Court concluded that a period of “15 to 18
months’ imprisonment” would have been an appropriate sen-
tence “while not losing sight of the gravity of the [offense]: 
But for these attenuating circumstances, I am of the
view that a sentence of three to five years in the peni-
tentiary would not have been out of line. 
Unlawfully refusing to provide the police with a
breath sample after having caused an accident resulting
in a death is an extremely serious offence. . . . It carries
with it a maximum punishment of life imprisonment—
and with good cause. When a person refuses to provide
a breath sample in response to a lawful request, this
deprives the police, the court, the public at large, and the
family of the deceased of the best evidence as to the dri-
ver’s blood alcohol level and state of impairment. More-
over, it places a barrier in the way of the ongoing efforts
and pressing objective of deterring, denouncing, and
putting an end to the scourge of impaired driving. 
CONCLUSION—SUTER:
Though the Supreme Court concluded that a fit sentence at
the time of sentencing would have been one of fifteen to eigh-
teen months of imprisonment, it imposed a sentence of time
served because the accused 
spent almost nine months awaiting this Court’s decision
. . . to now impose on Mr. Suter what would have been a
fit disposition at the time he was sentenced would cause
him undue hardship, and serve no useful purpose. In
short, it would not be in the interests of justice to rein-
carcerate Mr. Suter at this time.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada has consid-
ered a number of important issues in the criminal law context
in 2018, including issues of evidence, procedure, and sentenc-
ing.
Interestingly, we have also seen the Supreme Court issue
brief oral judgments in cases which appeared to raise impor-
tant questions of law. These brief judgments can be tantaliz-
ingly difficult to apply. It is particularly interesting that these
judgments are primarily rendered in appeals that have come
before the Supreme Court as of right.
Finally, which of these judgments will have the greatest
long-term impact? I would choose the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Gubbins because the Court’s decision in this case settles
a long-standing disclosure issue in Canada. As the Supreme
Court noted in Gubbins: “Canadian courts have differed as to
which disclosure regime applies to breathalyzer maintenance
records.” Now, this issue is settled.
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
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